

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 03962 100505Z

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO: CAIRO, KINSHASA, RABAT, WHITE HOUSE

WH FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CG, AO, NI

SUBJECT: MOROCCAN AND EGYPTIAN ASSISTANCE TO ZAIRE AND NIGERIAN  
INITIATIVE

REF: STATE 079669

1. SUMMARY: I MET WITH AMBASSADOR AKADIRI THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS THE NIGERIAN INITIATIVE ON ANGOLA/ZAIRE IN LIGHT OF MOROCCAN DECISION TO SEND TROOPS TO ZAIRE. AKADIRI SAID FMG NOT RPT NOT SANGUINE THAT FOREIGN TROOPS WOULD FACILITATE RATHER THAN COMPLICATE THE POSSIBILITIES OF ARRANGING A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION. HE SAID SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES WOULD CONSIDER THE "CHOICE" OF MOROCCANS AS UNFORTUNATE, AND WOULD WISH TO KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT THE MOROCCANS HAD CONSULTED WITH U. S. IN ADVANCE. THE FMG HAD BEEN PLEASED TO LEARN FROM THE VISITING ANGOLAN DELEGATION THAT A "BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION" WITH ZAIRE EXISTED. THIS WAS IN MARKED CONTRAST WITH ORIGINAL ANGOLAN RESPONSE TO NIGERIAN INITIATIVE. AKADIRI FEARED THAT APPARENT ANGOLAN WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE MIGHT NOW RPT NOW ENCOUNTER RELUCTANCE FORM MOBUTU. ANGOLANS LEFT LAGOS THIS MORNING FOR  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LAGOS 03962 100505Z

LUANDA. FMG HAS NOT RPT NOT DECIDED NEXT STEP IN MEDIATION SCENARIO. END SUMMARY.

2. WITH OBASANJO AND SANUSI OUT OF TOWN AND GARBA STILL IN NEW DELHI, I PRESENTED REFTEL'S POINTS THIS MORNING TO AMBASSADOR AKADIRI, HEAD OF AFRICA DEPARTMENT OF MEA AND MEMBER OF FMG TEAM MEETING IN LAGOS FOR THE PAST THREE DAYS WITH ANGOLAN

DELEGATION. AKADIRI HAD ALSO ACCOMPANIED GARBA TO KINSHASA AND LUANDA.

3. AKADIRI SAID HE HAD HEARD RADIO REPORTS OF THE MOROCCAN TROOP OFFER, AS WELL AS A POSSIBLE DISPATCH OF EGYPTIANS. HE SAID FMG SHARED OUR HOPE THAT FOREIGN TROOPS WOULD ENABLE MOBUTU TO STABILIZE THE MILITARY SITUATION. STABILITY MIGHT PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT THAT WOULD FACILITATE A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM. INDEED, MOBUTU'S FAILURE TO PUT UP ANY EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE TO THE KATANGAN INVADERS HAD MADE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT FOR NIGERIA TO SELL ITS MEDIATION OFFER TO THE ANGOLANS IN THE FIRST PLACE. ON THE OTHER HAND, AKADIRI SAW THE ROLE OF FOREIGN TROOPS AS POSSIBLY CUTTING THE OTHER WAY AS WELL. MOBUTU MIGHT THINK HE COULD NOW RPT NOW FINISH OFF THE KAT-ANGANS FOR ONCE AND FOR ALL AND THUS MIGHT LOSE INTEREST IN FURTHER NEGOTIATING.

4. AKADIRI SAW ANOTHER PROBLEM IN THE "CHOICE" OF THE MOROCCANS FOR THIS JOB. HE SAID MOROCCO IS GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE "OUT OF STEP" WITH OTHER OAU MEMBERS. MOROCCAN DISREGARD FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN THE WESTERN SAHARA AND ALLEGED COMPLICITY IN THE MERCENARY ATTACK ON BENIN WOULD RAISE QUESTIONS IN MANY AFRICAN MINDS REGARDING MOBUTU'S JUDGEMENT IN CALLING ON MOROCCANS TO DO SOMETHING HIS OWN ARMY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DO WITHOUT OUTSIDE HELP. AKADIRI FORESAW ADDITIONAL CRITICISM FROM SOME WHO WOULD ADOPT THE LINE THAT THE U.S., WELL KNOWN AS A CLOSE FRIEND OF THE KING, HAD PUT THE MOROCCANS UP TO IT. HE WONDERED WHETHER WE KNEW IN ADVANCE OF THE MOROCCAN  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LAGOS 03962 100505Z

DECISION. IN REPLY I STUCK TO MY SCRIPT AND DISCLAIMED ANY FOREKNOWLEDGE, OBSERVING THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE IN THE MIDST OF CHAOS AND THAT INTENSIFIED DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS WERE NOW ALL THE MORE NECESSARY TO PREVENT ESCALATED VIOLENCE.

5. ON THE QUESTION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AKADIRI STRESSED THAT NIGERIA'S POSITION WAS CLEAR TO ALL AND COULD BE COUNTED ON. JUST AS NIGERIA BELIEVED IN SELF-DETERMINATION FOR DJIBOUTI AND WOULD NOT SUPPORT SOMALIA'S CLAIMS TO THAT TERRITORY OR TO PARTS OF KENYA AND ETHIOPIA, NIGERIA FAVORED AN INDEPENDENT WESTERN SAHARA AND OBJECTED TO MOROCCO'S CLAIMS TO HALF OF IT. BY THE SAME TOKEN, NIGERIA COULD NOT COUNTENANCE A SEPARATION OF SHABA FROM ZAIRE ANY MORE THAN IT COULD ACCEPT BIAFRAN SEPARATISM.

6. ADKADIRI REITERATED THAT THE INITIAL ANGOLAN RESPONSE TO NIGERIA'S MEDIATION OFFER HAD BEEN NEGATIVE, NETO SIMPLY TAKING THE POSITION THAT ANGOLA HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH WHAT HAPPENED IN SHABA AND HAD NO WAY TO INFLUENCE DEVELOPMENTS THERE.

GARBA HAD ARGUED HARD THAT A STABLE ZAIRE WAS IN ANGOLA'S BEST INTERESTS, AND THAT

ONLY FROM A BASE OF SUCH STABILITY COULD ANGOLA HOPE TO GET WHAT IT WANTED OUT OF MOBUTU, I.E., A PEACEFUL ANGOLA/ZAIRE FRONTIER, RENEWED COMMITMENT TO THE PLEDGE TO FREEZE OUT FNLA AS PROMISED BY MOBUTU LAST YEAR IN BRAZZAVILLE, NON-INTERFERENCE IN CABINDA AND A CRACKDOWN ON FLEC, AND THE RETURN OF CAPITAL GOODS HELD BY ZAIRE. ANGOLA NEEDED FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL ITS NEIGHBORS IF IT HOPED TO END INTERNAL STRIFE. THE FMG HAD BEEN GRATIFIED TO LEARN IN ITS CURRENT TALKS WITH THE ANGOLAN MISSION TO LAGOS THAT NETO NOW SHARED THIS PERCEPTION AND AGREED THAT A "BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION" WITH ZAIRE INDEED EXISTED.

7. AKADIRI URGED THAT THE U.S. IMPRESS UPON MOBUTU THE IMPORTANCE OF OFFERING KATANGAN GENDARMES THE CHANCE TO REINTEGRATE THEMSELVES INTO THE LIFE OF SHABA. OTHERWISE AKADIRI SAW THEM AS RETURNING  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 LAGOS 03962 100505Z

TO ANGOLA AND CONSTITUTING A CONTINUING THREAT TO MOBUTU AND THEREFORE A PROBLEM FOR NETO. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, AKADIRI SAID THE ANGOLANS HAD NOT RAISED THIS MATTER BUT HE SAW IT AS COMING UP IN THE FUTURE. I SUGGESTED NIGERIANS AND OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES COULD APPROPRIATELY MAKE THE SAME SUGGESTION TO MOBUTU.

8. THE TALKS WITH THE ANGOLANS HAD IN FACT GONE BETTER THAN EXPECTED. THE ANGOLANS WERE RETURNING TO LUANDA THIS MORNING. THE ANGOLAN DEFENSE MINISTER HAD HEADED THE MISSION. SUBJECTS INCLUDED IN THE TALKS IN ADDITION TO THE ZAIRE PROBLEM, WERE THE CONCLUSION OF A TRADE AGREEMENT (SEPTIL FORTHCOMING), FINANCIAL MATTERS, LAGOS-LUANDA AIRLINE SERVICES, AND MANPOWER TRAINING (E.G., DRIVERS AND SECRETARIES).

9. THE NEXT STEP IN THE NIGERIAN MEDIATION SCENARIO REMAINS TO BE DETERMINED. AKADIRI SAID THE ESSENTIAL PURPOSE OF THE JUST-CONCLUDED TALKS WITH THE ANGOLANS WAS NOT TO NEGOTIATE OR MEDIATE IN ANY WAY BUT RATHER TO OBTAIN THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT'S OFFICIAL REPLY TO NIGERIA'S MEDIATION OFFER. THAT REPLY HAD BEEN FAVORABLE, I.E., A "BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION" EXISTED. HOWEVER, THE FMG WOULD NOW BE OBLIGED TO REASSESS THE SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW FACTOR OF THE INTRODUCTION OF MOROCCAN AND POSSIBLY EGYPTIAN TROOPS. AKADIRI SAID HE WAS NONETHELESS CONFIDENT THAT THE FMG WOULD SHARE U.S. CONCERN THAT DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO VIOLENCE BE REDOUBLED. IN THE LIGHT OF THE RELATIVELY UPBEAT ANGOLAN RESPONSE AND THE NEW FACTOR OF FOREIGN TROOPS, AKADIRI DID NOT KNOW WHETHER OBASANJO WOULD CALL GARBA BACK FROM THE NEW DELHI MEETINGS. AKADIRI THOUGHT OBASANJO MIGHT TEMPORARILY DEPUTIZE SOMEONE ELSE FOR THE ANGOLA/ZAIRE PROBLEM, THUS PERMITTING GARBA TO STAY WITH HIS PRESENT ITINERARY, WHICH

TAKES HIM ON A TEN-DAY TOUR OF EASTERN EUROPE AFTER NEW DELHI.

10. AKADIRI SAID HE WAS MOST GRATEFUL FOR MY PRESENTATION. HE WOULD BRING IT TO THE ATTENTION OF HIS SUPERIORS AS SOON AS HE COULD MAKE CONTACT WITH THEM. HE SAID THE FMG CONTINUED TO  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 LAGOS 03962 100505Z

APPLAUD THE RESTRAINT DISPLAYED BY THE U.S. WITH REGARD TO ARMS SUPPLY TO SHABA AND HE ASSURED ME OF THE FMG'S CONTINUING INTEREST IN KEEPING IN CLOSE COMMUNICATION WITH US IN THIS MATTER.

11. AS THIS TELEGRAM CONTAINS THE ONLY REPORT WE MAY GET FOR A NUMBER OF DAYS CONCERNING STATUS OF THE NIGERIAN INITIATIVE, WE SUGGEST DEPARTMENT DISTRIBUTE IT TO FOLLOWING POSTS IN ADDITION TO KINSHASA WHO HAVE BEEN ADDRESSEES OF SIMILAR TRAFFIC: BRUSSELS, DAR ES SALAAM, LONDON, LUSAKA, MOSCOW, PARIS, PRETORIA, CAPETOWN, USMISSION USUN NEW YORK, ADDIS ABABA, LUBUMBASHI, NAIROBI, LISBON AND BONN.  
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